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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal of four issues, with two sub issues, in which one of the issues is being
appealed from the Order Granting a Petition for Rehearing and Granting Requests for counsel
Fees ("Order on Rehearing'') and the other issues from Decision and Order on Appeal
("Decision on Appeal'') issued both by the Honorable Darren B. Simpson. This Decision on
Appeal was issued on the 22nd of April, 2019 and the Order on Rehearing was issued on the
22nd of August, 2019. In the Decision on Appeal the District Court upheld five of the six issues
presented. (R. Vol I. p. 218-258). However, the District Court overturned the sixth issue relating
to the Co-Personal Representatives' request for administrative fees and expenses. Id. The District
Court held that the Magistrate Court erred because it failed to provide any finding of any facts or
conclusion of law in support of its decision in granting the administrative fees. Id. at 258 L. 6.
The District Court remanded that issue back to the Magistrate Court to issue new findings of
facts and conclusions of law. The Magistrate has yet to render new findings of facts or
conclusions of law. Id. at 258.
Also in the Decision on Appeal, the District Court originally denied attorney fees to both
parties. Id. at 257. However, the Appellees filed a Petition for Rehearing and requested the
Court to reconsider and grant attorney fees to them. Id. at 260-263. The Court held a status
conference and determined that it was going to grant the Petition for Rehearing but allow the
Appellants to respond to the Appellees' brief. Id. at 265-266. In the Order on Rehearing, the
District Court granted attorney fees to the Appellees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 holding
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that Appellants' appeal was pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. The
Appellants then appealed to the Supreme Court. Id. at 289.
This case originally started as an informal probate according to Idaho Code § 15-3-301
which was filed on March 10th, 2015. Id. at 19-20. The informal probate was converted to a
formal probate according to Idaho Code § 15-3-402 on March 17th, 2015. Id. 47-49. The action
became contested and the case had two contested evidentiary hearings that were tried before the
Magistrate Court. Id. at 43-46 & 109-114. The Appellants, in the first contested hearing,
requested that Vicky Berryamn be removed from being a Co-Personal Representative. Id. at
40-42. The Court denied Appellants' Motion for Removal. Id. at 46. After the Court denied

Appellants' Motion to remove Vicky as Co-Personal Representative, Rodeny and Vicky
conducted the estate as Co-Personal Representatives. They petitioned to close the estate after
almost two years. Id. at 55-59. The Appellants objected to closing the estate as they argued that
Vicky and Rodney had failed to provide them the information that was required to be provided to
them through either the inventory or accounting. Id. at 69-71. The Court denied the Appellant's
objection and ordered the estate to be closed after the contested proceeding. Id. at 114.
The Appellants' now appeal on the basis that the lower courts erred in both fact and law
by closing the estate by not requiring the Co-Personal Representatives to provide a proper
inventory or an accounting to the heirs; abused its discretion by not allowing the heirs to put on
essential witnesses on the hearing closing the estate; erred in both fact and law in holding that the
sale of the real property was reasonable; and erred by granting fees to the Appellees on appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121.
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II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

A. Did the District Court err by citing an improper Judgment holding that the
Magistrate Court conducted findings of facts and conclusions of law which
the Appellants' counsel did not have an opportunity to review or approve or
even an opportunity to brief the issue after the appeal was already
conducted?
B. Did The District Court err in the findings of fact and conclusions of law in
affirming the Magistrate's decision that the Co-Personal Representatives
provided an adequate inventory and accounting pursuant to the probate
statutes regarding the administration of the estate?
C. Did the District Court err by applying an abuse of discretion standard
finding that the Magistrate Court did not err by adopting the Personal
Representatives inventory and accounting and the sale was reasonable?
D. Did the District Court err by excluding essential witnesses and failing to
grant a continuance in the closing of the estate that would have had an
impact on the reasonable sale of the home?
E. Did the District Court err in both findings of fact and conclusions of law that
the sale of the real property was reasonable?
F. Did the District Court err by granting counsel fees on appeal pursuant to
Idaho Code 12-121?

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A) De Novo and Clearly Erroneous Review
Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (b) allows an appeal " [from] any interlocutory or final order,
judgment or decree of a District Court in a probate proceeding ... which is ... appealable from
the magistrates division to the District Court by statute or these rules." Idaho Code § 17-201(6)
provides for an appeal, in probate matters, from a magistrate's judgment or order settling an
account of an executor. See Idaho Code§ 17-201(6); See also In re Estate of Spencer, 106 Idaho
316,318,678 P.2d 108,110 (Ct. App. 1984).
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A District Court's findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous,
although the appellate court exercises free review over conclusions of law. See Carney v.
Heinson, 133 Idaho 275, 985 P.2d 1137 (1999); Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700, 274 P.3d 1

(Ct. App. 2012).
Abuse of Discretion
"Whether the trial court should have excluded witnesses is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard." State v. Cardell, 132 Idaho 217,219, 970 P.2d 10, 12 (1998). To determine
if there has been an abuse of discretion, this Court applies the following three factors:
(1 )Whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) Whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of this
discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it; and (3) Whether the trial court reached its decision
by an exercise of reason. Dillon v. Montgomery, 138 Idaho 614, 617, 67
P.3d 93, 96 (2003).
The Court also must rely on the Idaho Rules of Evidence to determine which evidence
should be admissible. Id. Pursuant to Idaho Rules of Evidence 402 and 403, the Court has
discretion to determine what evidence may be relevant, waste of time, cumulative,
misleading, confusing, or would be undue delay. Id.

IV.

ARGUMENT

A. The District Court erred by citing an improperly drafted Judgment in
holding that the Magistrate conducted findings of facts and conclusions of
law which the Appellants' counsel did not have an opportunity to review or
approve or even have an opportunity to brief the issue after the appeal was
already conducted.
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a)(l) requires a trial court in all actions tried upon the
facts without a jury to "find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon
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and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment." Id. The rule also provides that findings and
conclusions do not have to be in writing but can be sufficient as long they are recorded on the
record or in a separate document besides the judgment. Id.
Ordinarily, in reviewing a decision of the District Court on appeal from a magistrate, we
must determine from the trial court (magistrate) record whether substantial evidence supports the
magistrate's findings of fact and whether those findings support the magistrate's conclusions of
law. See Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981); Ustick v. Ustick, 104 Idaho
215, 657 P.2d 1083 (Ct.App.1983). If so, and if correct legal principles have been applied, then
the District Court's decision affirming a magistrate's judgment will be upheld. Id. Absent such
circumstances, the failure of the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law
concerning the material issues arising from the pleadings, upon which proof is offered, will
necessitate a reversal of the judgment and a remand for additional findings and conclusions and,
where there is no evidence which would support further findings material to the judgment, the
judgment will simply be reversed, the party having failed to prove his claim. See Pope v.
Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217,225, 646 P.2d 988, 996 (1982) Citing In the Matter of the
Estate ofLewis, 97 Idaho 299, 302, 543 P.2d 852, 855 (1975)).
In our case, the Magistrate failed to provide any findings of facts and conclusions of law
m regards to whether the Co-Personal Representatives provided an adequate or completed
inventory and accounting according to Idaho Code § 15-3-706. 1 The Magistrate did not write any
findings of facts and conclusions law. (TR Vol 1, p. 300-306: 78-80). The District Court realised
this when it stated, "he did not file findings and conclusions. Instead, he signed the Final

1

The only possible findings of facts and conclusions of law are in the transcript for the March 27th, 2017 hearing.
See TR Vol. 1, p. 300-306: 78-80. There is no mention of accounting or inventory in any of those pages.
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Accounting Order which approved the Estate's final accounting, awarded expenses to Vicki and
Rodney, and divided residual Estate amongst the six devisees." (R Vol. 1, p. 236).
After the notice of appeal was filed, briefs submitted, and oral argument provided, the
District Court improperly stayed the appeal sua sponte and ordered the Magistrate Court to draft
a final judgment. (R Vol. 1, p. 202-203).Without giving any notice or having a discussion with
the Appellants' counsel, the Magistrate Court allowed Appellees' to draft the final judgments.
Appellees' counsel drafted three separate final judgments. (R Vol. 1, p. 205-217). During this
time, none of the judgments were provided to the Appellants' counsel to review or approve
before submission. Appellants' counsels name or address was not placed upon the certificate of
services on the original Order Staying the Appeal, Final Judgment I, Second Order Staying
Appeal, and Amended Final Judgment even though Appellants' counsel had already filed his
substitution of counsel. (R. Vol I. p. 112 & 202-212). However, in the Second Amended Final
Judgment Appellant's counsel was placed within the certificate of service that was accepted by
the Court. Id. at 217. The First Judgment ("Final Judgment") was initially sent to Stephen Blaser,
the previous counsel of record. Id. at 206. Appellants' counsel did not have an opportunity to
review it before it was signed. The Second Judgment ("Amended Final Judgment") was again
not provided to Appellants' counsel to review or approve before it was signed by the Magistrate.
It was only provided to Appellants' counsel a day after it was signed. The third Judgment

("Second Amended Final Judgment") was accepted by the District Court as being the appropriate
final judgment. This judgment was again only sent to the Appellants' counsel after it was signed
by Magistrate Court. The Appellants' counsel had no ability to review any of the judgments at
any time before they were submitted. Also Appellants' counsel never approved any of the final
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judgments.
After The District Court approved the final judgment, ("Second Amended Final
Judgment") the District Court wrote his opinion and issued his decision. Id. This sequence of
events is important.("Emphasis Added") The Final Judgment II ("Amended Final Judgment")
was drafted and signed after the parties already completed briefing and oral argument. 2 Meaning
the only record which could have been construed as finding facts and conclusion of law was the
recorded record on March 27th, 201 7. 3 This record clearly lacks findings of facts and conclusion
of law. (TR Vol. 1, p. 300-306: 78-80). As a result, when the notice of appeal was originally filed
the Magistrate Court never issued findings of facts and conclusions of law. Clearly, Appellants
should have won the appeal because the Magistrate Court clearly erred pursuant to Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure 52(a)(l).
However, when the District Court issued his Decision and Order he specifically cited the
Magistrate Court's ("Second Amended Judgment") holding that the Magistrate Court did issue
findings of facts or conclusions of law in relation to the inventory and accounting. (R Vol. 1, p.
236; See Footnote 104 and 105). The Appellants had no idea that the District Court would cite to
an inappropriate judgment, which was not approved by Appellants, or given an opportunity to
rebut the judgment.
The District Court's citing of Judgment II was clear err and inappropriate for several
reasons. First, the District Court should not have sua sponte stayed the proceedings and asked for
a final judgment to be issued from Magistrate Court because Idaho Code§ 17-201 grants a party

2

Oral Argument was conducted on July 30th, 2018 and Final Judgment II was signed by the Magistrate Court on
January 17th, 2019.
3
This is the only document or recording which was issued by the Magistrate before the (3) final judgments were
drafted and signed by the Magistrate Court.
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to file an appeal from a final order closing the estate. The Appellants' appeal was procedural
correct when the District Court ordered a final judgment to be entered.
Second, it was inappropriate for the Magistrate Court to order the Appellees to draft the
judgments because Appellees knew the Appellants argument on appeal. This knowledge of the
appeal allowed them to put improper findings of facts and conclusions of law into a judgment
which directly assessed the issues on appeal. (R. Vol 1, p. 210-212). Further, Appellees' counsel
never provided this judgment to the Appellants' counsel before it was signed. Appellants'
counsel did not have the ability to approve the judgment to any content or form before it was
submitted and sent to the District Court.
Third, the District Court improperly cited Final Judgment II to support his Decision and
Order on appeal. (R Vol. 1, p. 214). The District Court cited Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure

54(a)(l) in his order holding that "A Judgment must not contain a recital of pleadings, the report
of a master, the record of prior proceedings, the court's legal reasoning, findings of fact or
conclusions of law". Id. Further, he ordered that the findings of facts and conclusions of law to
be stricken from the judgment completely. Id. Therefore, the District Court clearly erred by
relying on this Judgment to support his decision and opinion.
Although the District Court stated that the Magistrate Court did not file findings of facts
and conclusions of law, the District Court went on to rely on the Amended Final Judgment. (R
Vol. 1, p. 236). The citation of Judgment II is the only place where the District Court's Decision
and Order supports that the Magistrate Court issued any findings of facts and conclusions of law

in relation to the inventory and accounting. (R Vol. 1, p. 229-244). Without this supporting
citation, the District Court should have held that the Magistrate Court erred pursuant to I.R.C.P.
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54(a)(l) by failing to issue findings of facts and conclusions of law. Therefore, this Court should
respectfully reverse the District's Court decision as it was a clear err for the District Court to
improperly rely on Judgment II.
Lastly, the language provided in the Final Judgment II should not be considered findings
of facts and conclusions of law because I.R.C.P. 52(a)(l) and I.R.C.P. 54(a)(l) require the Court
to either issue findings of facts and conclusions of laws through the record or by either issuing a
memorandum or opinion separate from the judgment. Id. The only findings and facts and
conclusions of law that could even be considered issued in relation to a proper inventory or
accounting is within Judgment II. The recorded record on March 27th, 2017, which was the only
record the Appellants' had before they filed an appeal, does not have any findings of facts or
conclusion of law in regards to the inventory or accounting. Since Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure 52 and 54 disallow placing findings and facts and conclusions of law within a proper
judgment, this Court should respectfully hold that the District Court clearly erred by relying on
an improper Judgment. (Emphasis added.) Id.
Further, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 83(f)(B)(3) states, "If the District Court
determines that the record of the proceedings in the Magistrate Court is inadequate for an
appellate proceeding, the District Court must order that the appeal be heard as a trial de novo or
remand the matter to the magistrate's division. Id. If the appeal is heard as a trial de novo, the
District Court must render a decision in the action as a trial court as though the matter were
initially brought in the District Court." Id. Since no findings of facts and conclusions of law were
issued, and by relying on an improper judgment, the District Court erred in failing to hold a trial
de novo or remanding the case back to the magistrate.
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B. The District Court erred in findings of fact and law in affirming the
Magistrate's decision that the Co-Personal Representatives provided an
adequate inventory and accounting pursuant to the probate statutes
regarding the administration of the estate.
Idaho Code § 15-1-201(42) provides that "'settlement,' in reference to a decedent's estate,
includes the full process of administration, distribution and closing." (Emphasis added.) Idaho
Code 15-1-201 (42) "The settlement of an estate consists in its administration by the executor ...
so that nothing remains but to make a final distribution." In re Estate ofSpencer, 106 Idaho 316,
318, 678 P.2d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 1984)(Citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1231 (rev. 5th
ed. 1979). Final settlement of an estate refers to closing the business of the estate and finally
discharging the executor from his duties. Id. Until the estate is closed, the Magistrate may
correct, or may allow the executor to correct, the executor's accounts. See, generally, 31 Am. Jur.
2d Executors and Administrators §§ 546, 547 (1967). See also In re Estate of Irwin, 99 Idaho
543, 585 P.2d 953 (1978); I.C. §§ 15-3-501, 15-3-1001.
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-3-706 a Personal Representative is required to provide an
inventory to their heirs by either filing it with the Court or providing copies to the heirs who
request it. See Idaho Code§ 15-3-706; See also (commentary which explains that in 1975 Joint
Editorial Board eliminated "or " from the language of the text making it mandatory according to
a Personal Representatives fiduciary duty to provide copy to each heir.)
Idaho Code § 15-3-706 states:
Within three (3) months after his appointment, a personal representative, except
for a special administrator or a successor to another representative who has
previously discharged this duty, shall prepare an inventory of property owned by
the decedent at the time of his death, listing it with reasonable detail, and
indicating as to each listed item, its fair market value as of the date of the
decedent's death, and the type and amount of any encumbrance that may exist
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with reference to any item. Id.
Furthermore, Idaho Code § 15-3-1001 states, "(a) A personal representative or any
interested person may petition for an order of complete settlement of the estate." It further states,
"the interested person may request the Court to consider the final account or compel or approve
an accounting and distribution." Id. According to the recorded record on March 27th, 201 7, the
Magistrate Court did not find any findings of facts which supported that a proper inventory was
conducted within (3) months and that a full accounting of the estate was complete before closing
the estate. (TR, Vol. 1, p. 300-306: 78-80). In actuality, the facts support an opposite conclusion.
As previously argued at the District Court level, the Co-personal Representatives did not
provide the inventory to the Appellants of the estate until the actual final hearing on March 27th,
2017. (TR Vol. 1, p. 293, L. 18-21: 77). The District Court held this by stating, "The Estate
presented the inventory to Cindy, Jodi, and John at the hearing on March 27th, 2017." (R Vol. 1,
p. 236); See also Footnote 106). Further, the Co-Personal Representatives counsel, "stated I have
the inventory and appraisement that probably ought to be made a part of the court file." (TR Vol.
1, p. 293, L. 18-21: 77). March 27th, 2017 was in approximate two years after the estate opened.
(R Vol. 1, p. 13). Clearly, the inventory was not completed or given to Jodi, Cindy, or John as
requested within (3) months according to Idaho Code § 15-3-706.
Furthermore, Appellants argued that the Co-Personal Representatives breached their
fiduciary duty by not completing the inventory or giving them the inventory as required under
Idaho Code§ 15-3-706. (R Vol. 1, p. 69-70.; R Vol. 1, p. 106-107). The District Court did agree
that the Appellants had a valid argument under the law. (R Vol. 1, p. 236). However, the District
Court held that the issue was never raised at the trial court level. Id. As a result, the District
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Court did not consider it on appeal. Id. at 19-20.
However, this finding was err because in Judgment II, which the Court cited for Finding
of Facts and Conclusions of law, it stated that the Co-Personal Representatives did not breach
their fiduciary duty. (R Vol. 1, p. 211,

,r

6). Although Judgment II should not have been cited

for any reason at all, it is clear that the District Court was picking and choosing what issues were
raised within Judgment II. Moreover, if the District Court is able to cite Judgment II to support
that the Magistrate Court issued Findings of Facts and Conclusions of law, then obviously a
breach of fiduciary duty was clearly raised at the lower court level.
In addition, in the recorded record on March 27th, 2017 the Magistrate contemplated a
breach of fiduciary duty when he stated, "the Co-Representatives conduct was not that alarming
or bad." (TR Vol. 1, p 300-306: 78-80). Furthermore, the District Court acknowledged that the
Magistrate Court was listening for breaches of fiduciary duty when he stated, "Judge Hansen
explained he was not hearing substantive breaches of the Co-Personal Representatives' fiduciary
duties. Instead, he discerned that Cindy, Jodi, and John were nitpicking about the way Vicki and
Rodeny handled the estate." (R Vol. 1, p. 247). Therefore, the District Court erred that no breach
of fiduciary duty was raised at the trial and failed to analyze whether the Magistrate erred in
either fact or law that the Co-Personal Representatives breached their fiduciary duty.
Not only did the Court err in findings of fact in regards to the inventory, it erred in
findings of fact with regards to the accounting. As previously argued, the Appellants objected to
the closing of the estate. (R Vol. 1, p. 69-70). Appellants objected that they did not have a full
accounting of the estate on the day of the hearing. Id. Further, Appellants' objections requested
the Court to compel the Co-Personal Representatives to provide more information or a full
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accounting before closing the estate pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-3-1001. Id. The findings of fact
support that the Co-Personal Representatives never completed a full and proper accounting. Id.
The Co-Personal Representatives counsel stated that the accounting was incomplete and items
were missing. (TR, Vol. 1, p.119, L. 18-21: 33). Therefore, it is clear that the Court should not
have proceeded with the hearing because the Appellants had a statutory right to compel a
complete accounting before closing the estate.
Instead of the District Court relying on these factual findings, the District Court held that
Cindy, Jody and John's counsel waived their objections. (R, Vol. 1, p. 237). The District Court
held that Mr. Blaser waived his objections by not reasserting his objections after he overruled his
objections and ordered the parties into the hall to exchange information with opposing counsel.

Id. However, this was an error. Mr. Blaser asserted the Appellants' objections and the Magistrate
Court overruled those objections. (TR, Vol. 1, p. 118, L. 2-5: 33). The Magistrate stated, "I am
not inclined to continue the hearing." Id. The Court then ordered the parties in the hall to
exchange information and try to settle. Id. After the parties returned Appellees' counsel notified
the Court that no settlement was reached and that the case was in the Court's discretion on how
to proceed. (TR, Vol. 1, p. 118, L. 5-12: 33).
The Court asked the parties how the parties were going to proceed and received no
answer. (TR Vol. 1, p. 124, L. 5-6: 34). The Court then asked Mr. Blaser ifhe wanted to call the
Personal Representative first. (TR Vol. 1, p. 124, L. 7-9: 34). Mr. Blaser responded by stating,
"however the Court wishes." (TR Vol. 1, p. 124, L. 10-11: 34). The Appellants' counsel's
actions did not rise to the level of a waiver. Furthermore, Mr. Blaser again raised his objections
that a continuance was needed and that they needed more information later in the hearing. (TR,
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Vol. 1, p. 138-140: 38). Mr. Blaser stated, "Well, we'd ask for- we filed an objection and asked
for information. And then we got some of it, but we didn't get it all furnished. And so we wanted
more information so we could formulate - once we had the information reviewed, then we could
formulate, if necessary, more objections." Id. He further stated, "And the documentation hasn't
been furnished that we requested ... And so that's why I was hoping we'd get another
continuance, to review all of the information and we could be a little more pinpointed." Id. Mr.
Blaser never withdrew his original objections and the objections asserted within his Motion to
Continue that a full accounting needed to be provided before closing the estate. 4 Therefore, the
District Court erred in finding facts which constituted a waiver of the Appellants objections at
the trial level.
Lastly, the District Court erred by asserting mistakes of laws. The District Court held that
no err was committed by the Magistrate Court because Cindy, Jodi, and John did not file an
objection immediately after the family auction or did not file a Motion to Reconsider of the
Magistrate's order and asserting new evidence. (R Vol. 1, p. 238). This conclusion or finding is a
clear err. There is no law that requires a party to file a motion to reconsider and produce more
evidence to undermine a Magistrate's decision for an Appellate Court. Furthermore, there is no
law that an interested party in an estate must immediately file objections for a Court to consider
wrongdoings by the Personal Representatives. An interested party may assert an objection
throughout the probate as long as it is still open. See Idaho Code § 15-3-l00l(which allows
interested parties to make objections before the estate is closed); see also, generally, 31 Am. Jur.

2d Executors and Administrators §§ 546, 547 (1967). See also In re Estate of Irwin, 99 Idaho

4

See. Transcript generally.
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543, 585 P.2d 953 (1978). In addition, interested parties may even file a breach of fiduciary duty
claim up to (6) months after an estate has been closed. See Idaho Code§ 15-3-1005. The District
Court should have relied on Idaho Code § 15-3-706, Idaho Code § 15-3-1001, Idaho Code §
15-3-708, Idaho Code § 15-3-712, Idaho Code § 15-7-303, and Idaho Code § 15-7-302. These
statutes clearly show that a Personal Representative has a fiduciary duty and responsibility to
provide a full account and provide a proper inventory to the estate. Id. These statutes further
support that the estate should not be closed until a full accounting of the estate is completed. Id.
The Appellants made their objections clear that they were not provided a full accounting or
proper inventory before the March 27th, 2017 hearing. 5 The specific facts and law support that
they had valid objections. The Magistrate clearly erred by conducting the final hearing and not
making the Co-Personal Representatives provide a full account and proper inventory.
Therefore, Appellants respectfully request that this Court reverse the District Court's

Decision and Order.
C. The District Court erred by applying an abuse of discretion standard finding
that the Magistrate did not err by adopting the Personal Representatives
inventory and accounting and that the sale was reasonable.
Absent such circumstances, the failure of the trial court to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law concerning the material issues arising from the pleadings, upon which proof
is offered, will necessitate a reversal of the judgment and a remand for additional findings and
conclusions and, where there is no evidence which would support further findings material to the
judgment, the judgment will simply be reversed, the plaintiff having failed to prove his claim.

See Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 225, 646 P.2d 988, 996 (1982)( Citing In the

5

See Transcript Generally.
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Matter of the Estate of Lewis, 97 Idaho 299, 302, 543 P.2d 852, 855 (1975)). A District Court's
findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous, although the appellate
court exercises free review over conclusions oflaw. See Carney v. Heinson, 133 Idaho 275, 985
P.2d 1137 (1999); Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700, 274 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2012).
In this case Appellants appealed both issues of law and fact to the District Court. (R. Vol
1, p. 120 L. 5). There was an evidentiary contested trial in front of the Magistrate Court about
closing the estate. The witnesses were sworn in on the stand and cross examined. As a result, the
Magistrate was required to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. See. I.R.C.P. 52(a).
When the Appellants appealed both issues of law and fact in regards to the Magistrate's findings
of facts and conclusions of law, the District Court was required to apply either the De Novo
standard of review to the law or the clearly erroneous standard of review to the facts. See

Carney v. Heinson, 133 Idaho 275, 985 P.2d 1137 (1999); Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700,274
P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2012).

The District Court in our case erred because he did not apply either of

those two standards. Instead the District Court applied an Abuse of Discretion Standard. The
District Court stated, "A.

Judge Hansen did not Abuse his Discretion in Adopting the

Co-Personal Representatives' Inventory and Accounting." (R Vol.1, p. 229). The District Court
also stated, "A Judge Hansen did not Abuse his Discretion in Concluding that the Sale of the
Real Property was Reasonable." (R Vol. 1, p. 248). Furthermore, The District Court cited the
clearly erroneous standard for all issues besides the exclusion of witnesses and then applied the
wrong standard. 6
Since the District clearly erred by applying the wrong standard of review, Appellants

6

See R Vol. 1, p. 226-227. The District clearly identified that a clearly erroneous standard to be applied, but then
inappropriately applied the abuse of discretion. As a result, the District mixed the two standards which was err.
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respectfully request that this Court reverse the District's Court Order and Decision.
D. The District Court erred by excluding essential witnesses and failing to grant

the continuance in the closing of the estate that would have had an impact on
the reasonable sale of the home, and the fees granted on administration.

Pursuant to Idaho Law "Whether the trial court should have excluded witnesses 1s
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Cardell, 132 Idaho 217,219,970 P.2d
10, 12 (1998). Although the decision to grant or deny a continuance is discretionary, a court may
not refuse a continuance where the ends of justice clearly require it to be granted. See Ball v.
Daw Forest Prods. Co., 136 Idaho 155, 160, 30 P.3d 933, 938 (2001). To determine ifthere has

been an abuse of discretion, this Court applies the following three factors:
(1 )Whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
Whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of this discretion and
consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to
it; and (3) Whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
Dillon v. Montgomery, 138 Idaho 614, 617, 67 P.3d 93, 96 (2003).
The Court also must rely on the Idaho Rules of Evidence to determine which evidence should be
admissible. See Westby v. Schaefer, 157 Idaho 616, 627, 338 P.3d 1220, 1231 (2014). Pursuant
to the Idaho Rules of Evidence 402 and 403 the Court has discretion to determine what evidence
may be relevant, waste of time, cumulative, misleading, confusing, or would be undue delay. Id.
As argued below, the Magistrate clearly abused his discretion because his decision to
exclude the witnesses from testifying did not consist within the legal standards and the
Magistrate did not exercise such discretion with reason. The District Court erred in determining
that the Magistrate did not abuse its discretion by making up its own reason as to why the
Magistrate excluded the witnesses at trial. The Magistrate failed to issue any findings of facts
and conclusions of law in this case. The Magistrate did not issue an opinion but made his
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decision which was recorded on the record on March 27th, 2017. In nowhere in that decision
does the Magistrate correctly perceive that excluding witnesses is an abuse of discretion, applies
any legal standard, or exercises any reason or provides us an analysis as to why the witnesses
were excluded. (TR Vol. 1, p. 300-306: 78-80). Not only did the Magistrate not give any reason
why witnesses were excluded in his decision, the Magistrate specifically found that an expert
witness would have been essential in determining the reasonable sale of the real property. (TR
Vol. 1, p. 121, L. 13-17: 34). The Magistrate clearly abused his discretion because there was an
expert Mark Call who could have testified about the house.
The District Court also reasoned that the Magistrate did not abuse his discretion because
the District Court held that the Appellants failed to inform the Magistrate why Mark Call or
Charlie Bair needed to testify. (R Vol. 1, p. 246). This was an error. The facts specifically
supported that the Magistrate Court knew who Mark Call was and what he would testify about.
(TR Vol. 1, p.121, L. 13-17: 34). Mark Call was a Licensed Realtor that placed the home on the
market, and conducted the sale of the property. Id. The Magistrate knew that he could testify to
the relevant and important information regarding the sale of the home. (TR Vol. 1, p. 197-202:
53-54). The Appellees' counsel actually explained who Mark Call was and why he most likely
needed to testify. Id. The Appellees counsel also thought it as a good idea to continue the trial.
Id. Appellants' counsel told the Magistrate Court that he would like to call Mark Call. (TR Vol.

1, p. 202, L. 10-13: 54). He also stated he wanted to call additional witnesses but the Court was
not going to allow them. (TR Vol. 1, p. 295, L. 14-16: 77). Another issue relating to the sale of
the home was the nature of title. Mr. Call's testimony would have been very important and
relevant to this issue.
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The other two witnesses Steve Saxton, and Charlie Bair were just as important to call as
witnesses. The Court knew who Steve Saxton was as he was appointed as the auctioneer. (TR
Vol. 1, p. 254: 67). Steve Saxton could have testified about inventory that was sold and how the
auction was conducted. In addition, Charlie Bair was the buyer of the home. Furthermore,
Charlie Bair contacted the appraiser to appraise the real property. He was also a good friend of
one of the Co-Personal Representatives. (TR Vol. 1, p. 121, L. 22-25: 34). He also lived in the
home before he bought the house. Id. His testimony would have been important and relevant
because he could have testified about the purchase of the home, what services he rendered in lieu
of paying rent to the estate, and how close his relationship was to the Co-Personal Representative
Rodney. Id.
Lastly, the exclusion of witnesses was agam directly tied to the Co-Personal
Representatives failure to provide a complete inventory and accounting. The Appellants main
objection to closing of the estate was that a full and complete accounting had not been completed
or given to them. (R Vol. 1, p. 69-70). The Appellees' counsel admitted that the accounting had
not been completed. (TR Vol. 1, p. 119, L. 19-21 : 33). Appellants' counsel explained to the
Magistrate Court that it was too difficult to make out claims or call certain witnesses when the
Co-Personal Representatives had failed to provide them a full and complete accounting of the
estate. (TR Vol. 1, p. 140, L. 10-25: 38). Furthermore, on March 27th, 2017 the estate gave the
Appellants a pile of papers on the day of the hearing. (TR Vol. 1, p. 117, L. 17-22: 33). The
Appellants' counsel requested a continuance to give them an opportunity to review the
information and decide which claims to bring. (R Vol. 1, p. 106-107). The Court denied the
continuance because he believed the case had gone on too long and wanted it off his calendar.
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(TR Vol. 1, p. 118, L. 2-5: 33). The Magistrate Court only allowed the Appellants a small
snippet of time to go into the hall to look at the information. (TR Vol. 1, p. 118, L. 5-12: 33). The
Appellants did not have any opportunity or time to get a rebuttal expert to contest the newly
provided information that was just given to them. What's even worse is the Magistrate Court
ruled against the Appellants because they had failed to call any expert witness. (TR Vol. 1, p.
302, L. 15-19: 79).
The Magistrate Courts' reasoning on why he did not continue the hearing was because
the Appellants, specifically John, should have conducted his own title search and brought the
titles to the hearing, the Appellants should have conducted their own accounting of the estate,
Appellants should have performed depositions or discovery, the Appellants should have
subpoenaed the third party records from the bank, and they should tendered $72,000 or $50,000
to the Court or put up money for a bond if they did not want the sale of the house to go through.
(TR Vol. 1, p. 300-303: 78-79). All of these issues raised by the Court have no foundation in law
and are unreasonable.
In a probate case a Co-Personal Representative has a fiduciary obligation to provide an
inventory of the estate and a full accounting before the estate is closed. See, generally, 31 Am.
Jur. 2d Executors and Administrators §§ 546, 547 (1967). See also In re Estate of Irwin, 99
Idaho 543, 585 P.2d 953 (1978); I.C. §§ 15-3-501, 15-3-1001. The Appellants are not obligated
to perform discovery like in other civil cases. The Appellants can conduct discovery by
requesting an accounting. Furthermore, they are entitled to an inventory after (3) months.
Although the Appellants did not conduct depositions, the Appellants did conduct discovery by
requesting a full accounting of estate pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-3-1001. (R Vol. 1, p.
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106-107). Therefore, Appellants had no obligation to conduct further discovery.
In addition, Appellants had no obligation to perform their own accounting. The
Co-Personal Representatives have a fiduciary obligation to provide this information and to be
paid to make sure that these items are completed. If these items are not completed it is not the
Appellants' fault, but the Co-Personal Representatives. The law clearly states "The settlement of
an estate consists in its administration by the executor . . . so that nothing remains but to make a
final distribution." See In re Estate of Spencer, 106 Idaho 316,318,678 P.2d 108, 110 (Ct. App.
1984)(Citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1231 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). The Magistrate clearly
abused its discretion by not exercising sound reason in failing to grant the continuance.
The Magistrate Courts' reasoning that the Appellants were required to put up some kind
of bond with an objection to prevent the sale of the home was unreasonable. (TR Vol. 1, p.
300-303: 78-79). There is no law that requires such a burden. The interested parties have every
right to object to the sale of the home. Furthermore, they have every right to raise the issue of
breach of fiduciary duty if the Co-Personal Representatives failed to sell the home in the best
interest of the estate. This reasoning was clearly an abuse of discretion.
The Magistrate abused its discretion by failing to grant the continuance and excluding
the witnesses by; (1) failing to provide any reasoning in excluding the witnesses; (2) by not
allowing a continuance for the Appellants to receive a full accounting of the estate which is
required by law; (3) by not allowing them further time to review the newly added information;
(4) excluding the potential rebuttal expert witnesses of Charlie Bair, Steve Saxton, and Mark
Call; and (5) failing to exercise sound reasoning in excluding the witnesses and continuing the
hearing.
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E. The District Court erred in both law and fact that the sale of the real
property was reasonable?
The District Court erred in holding that the sale of the real property was reasonable
because there were no findings of facts and conclusions of law that the sale of the real estate
property was reasonable. (TR Vol. 1, p. 300-303: 78-79). As stated above the District Court
should have either conducted a trial de novo or remanded the case back to the Magistrate. See
I.R.C.P. 83(f)(B)(3). Therefore, this Court should have respectively reversed the District Court's
Decision and Order.
Nonetheless if this Court alternatively concludes that the March 27th, 201 7 record does
contain findings of facts and conclusion oflaw regarding the reasonable sale of the real property,
it is clear that the Magistrate's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. In addition, the Magistrate
erred in law. The District Court cited the Magistrate's oral findings and conclusions which
stated:
The Fourth thing that I see here is that, if John and the others are really
concerned about the purchase price of the property, they could have tendered to
the estate or tendered to the Court $72,000, $60,0000 or some other money, or
they could have filed a motion with the Court and said "Judge, that sale to Charlie
Bair was so nasty and smelled so bad we want that set aside."
"And not only do we want it set aside, we will post a bond with the Court
or will post with the Court the appraised value of $72,500 or $75,000 whatever it
is. And then, Judge, we will litigate with Charlie Bair and figure out whatever
improvements he put into it. We'll pay him, and we'll get him out of the picture.
But we're going to keep this in the family in the estate."
That procedure could have been done at a number of different levels.
Nothing has been done in that regard, which tells me that nobody is too terribly
serious about trying to hang on to that property.
The fifth thing that I wrote down here is that there were no expert
witnesses brought in to testify about the value of the home or the value of the
property. There was just nothing brought in or done in that regard. (R Vol. 1, p.
250).
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These findings only argue that the Appellants should have procedurally done something more.
Id. None of these findings support that the sale of the home was reasonably sold by the

Co-Personal Representatives. Id. Instead, the Court's findings actually seem to indicate that the
Appellants did object to the sale of the home but because they failed to provide a bond it was
inadequate. Id. These findings are clearly erroneous to support that the home was reasonably
sold.
The Magistrate Court also erred in law because it held that the Appellants' objection
required them to post some kind of bond in the amount of the purchase price of the home to
forgo the sale. There is no law that requires the interested parties in the estate to post some kind
of bond in their objection to preclude the sale of the home. In addition, the Court found the sale
was reasonable because no expert witnesses testified. Again there is no requirement that an
expert witness has to be called to determine whether the sale was reasonable. This was clearly
erroneous.
Instead, there were clear non-conflicting facts in the record to support that the sale was
unreasonable. There was an appraisal submitted to the Court. (Exhibit D, p. 225-246). There
was a $22,500 difference between the appraisal price and the purchase price of the home.
(Exhibit D, p. 229); See also (TR Vol. 1, p. 190, L, 23: 51 ).
The appraisal further confirmed that the nature of the title included a manufactured home
on land. (Exhibit D, p. 225-246). This finding is nowhere in the Court's opinion and this fact is
very material and relevant. Furthermore, there were facts presented which proved that if the
Co-Personal Representatives would have changed the title to real property with an attached
home, from a property with manufactured home, other buyers could have received financing.
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(TR Vol. 1, p. 189, p. 199-200: 51 & 53). There were further facts that the Co-Personal
Representatives had received other offers that were at least $25,000 dollars more than the
$50,000 sale they accepted. (TR Vol. 1, p. 189, L. 17: 51). The Co-Personal Representatives
admitted that they did nothing to change the title of the property. (TR Vol. 1, p. 154-155: 42).
These facts prove that the Co-Personal Representatives did not take the necessary steps to
reasonably sell the property for the best purchase price. (TR Vol. 1, p. 153-154: 42).
The Co-Personal Representatives' failure to change the title directly reduced the estate's
value by at least $25,000. Again the facts proved that John White II offered to purchase the home
for $65,000 and there was another offer for $75,000. (TR Vol. 1, p. 189, p. 199-200: 51 & 53).
Both offers failed because of financing. Id. The financing failed because the banks would not
grant the individuals or John White II a conventional loan due to the nature of the title. Id.
Therefore, the loss of John White II' s offer was directly related to the Co-Personal
Representatives failure to change the title. These facts prove that the Co-Personal
Representatives failed to reasonably sell the property.
The Magistrate's findings of fact that the sale of the home was sold reasonably is clearly
erroneous. The facts clearly support that the sale of the home was unreasonably sold.
Furthemore, the law applied to conclude that the sale was reasonable was of clear error because
no such laws exist. The Appellants respectfully requests that the Court remand that case back to
the Magistrate to determine if the sale of the home was reasonably conducted.
F. Did the District Court err by granting counsel fees on appeal pursuant to
Idaho Code 12-121?
Idaho Code Appellate Rule 41 requires a party to cite to statutory authority or common
law authority to be granted attorney fees and costs on appeal. See Idaho Appellate Rule 41, See
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also Dominguez v. Evergreen Res., Inc., 142 Idaho 7, 14, 121 P.3d 938, 945 (2005)(denying
attorney fees for failing to cite the correct authority for attorney fees on appeal). If a party fails to
cite the correct statutory or common law basis for their attorney fees request in their original
briefing on appeal, then this Court should deny them their request for attorney fees. Id.
Furthermore, even if there is a citation to the authority, such citation must be accompanied by an
argument and request. See Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 805, 241 P.3d 972, 978 (2010),
Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. Quail Ridge Med. Inv'r, LLC, 156 Idaho 709,721,330 P.3d 1067, 1079
(2014).
The Co-Personal Representatives' original brief argues that Idaho Code § 12-121 is
inapplicable for requesting attorney fees and costs in probate matters. (R Vol. 1, p. 176-177). The
Appellees incorrectly argued that the Supreme Court has held that all probate matters will be
granted attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-8-208. Id. As a result, the Appelees only
requested attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code§ 15-3-720 and Idaho Code§ 15-8-208.
Id. Their brief specifically states:
Respondents hereby claim a right to Attorney Fees on this appeal.This
claim raises issue a to whether the "old law" as stated in In re Estate ofKunzler,
109 Idaho 350, 254, 707 P.2d 461, 465 (Ct. App. 1985), controls an award of
costs including fees under the "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation"
standard imposed by Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l)- as limited by Idaho
Code § 12-121, or whether the 2005 statute, Idaho Code§ 15-8-208, the attorney
fee part of the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA), apples.
That issue was apparently set to rest by our Supreme Court in Quemada v.
Arizmendez, 153 Idaho 609, 617, 288 P.3d 826 (2012). We read that decision as
triggering this court's discretion to award attorney fees upon a claim by either
party invoking TEDRA authority. That statute allows this court to determine the
source of funds to pay the fees Idaho Code § 15-8-208. The probate court in this
matter at (TR Vol. 1, p. 299, L. 9), perceived the contested probate issues to be
subject to TEDRA.
Respondents also rely upon Idaho Code § 15-3-720, which provides in
material part "If any personal representative ... defends ... any proceeding in good
faith, whether successful or not, he is entitled to receive from the estate his
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necessary expenses and disbursements, including reasonable attorney's fees
incurred."
In this case the Defendants/Respondents are not only the Co-P.Rs; they are
also devisees under the Will, as is Debi. To impose liability for attorney fees on
the Estate assets punishes the Co-P.R.s and Debi, as well as the Appellants (on a
pro rata basis).
We therefore respectfully argue the authority granted by Idaho Code §
15-8-208, the respondents' claim for fees should be allocated exclusively to the
Appellants; to further assure recovery of the fees, the CO-P.R.s should be
authorized to deduct the fees from the final estate distribution to the three
Appellants, on a pro rata basis, i.e. forty per cent to Jody, forty percent to Cindy,
and twenty percent to John, reflecting the distribution under the will. Id.
The Co-Personal Representatives never requested the Court to grant them attorney fees
and costs under Idaho Code § 12-121. Id. In actuality, the Co-Personal Representatives argued
that Idaho Code § 12-121 was not applicable for asking for fees in a probate matter. Id. Instead
they argued that they should have been awarded attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code §
15-3-720 and Idaho Code § 15-8-208. Id. The District Court erred by granting attorney fees and
costs under Idaho Code § 12-121 because the Co-Personal Representatives failed to request fees
under the statute.
The District Court also erred by granting attorney fees and costs to the Appellees because
the Appeal was not pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation. The District
Court held that the Magistrate erred by failing to issue findings of facts and conclusions of law in
regards to the administrative expenses. (R Vol. 1, p. 256-257). He then remanded that issue back
to the Magistrate Court to issue findings and facts and conclusions of law. Id. Idaho Code §
12-121 has two requirements that the Court must find before they can award fees. First, a Court
must determine who the prevailing party is in the case. Second, it must find that the appeal was
pursued frivolously, unreasonable and without foundation. See Idaho § 12-121; see also Maselli
v. Ginner, 119 Idaho 702, 809 P.2d 1181 (Ct. App. 1991).
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Since an issue was held in the favor for the Appellants, the District Court reasonably
could not have held that the appeal was pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without
foundation. It is illogical to hold that a case was pursued frivolously, unreasonably and without
foundation when the actual party who pursued the appeal prevailed in part. Furthermore, there is
Idaho case law that supports that when both parties prevail in part, no fees should be awarded to
either party. See Waters Garbage v. Shoshone Cty., 138 Idaho 648, 653, 67 P.3d 1260, 1265
(2003), See Also Alderson v. Bonner, 142 Idaho 733, 745, 132 P.3d 1261, 1273 (Ct. App. 2006),
Lewiston Pre-Mix Concrete v. Rohde, 110 Idaho 640, 649, 718 P.2d 551, 560 (Ct. App. 1985),
Landvik v. Herbert (in Re Landvik), 130 Idaho 54, 63, 936 P.2d 697, 706 (Ct. App. 1997).
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(e)(2) also requires the District Court, when it awards
attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121, to make written findings. I.R.C.P. 52(a) The
purpose of requiring the District Court to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law
is to afford the appellate court a clear understanding of the District Court's decision, so that it
may be determined whether the District Court applied the proper law to the appropriate facts in
reaching its conclusion. See Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 225, 646 P.2d 988,
996 (1982). The absence of adequate findings and conclusions of law will require a reversal of
the judgment and remand for additional findings and conclusions.See Snipes v. Schalo, 130
Idaho 890, 893, 950 P.2d 262,265 (Ct. App. 1997).
The District Court granted attorney fees and costs to Appellees on their Petition for
Rehearing. (R Vol. 1, p. 287-290). However, the District Court failed to provide any written
findings, conclusions or any analysis as to why the Court found that the Appeal was frivolous,
unreasonable and without foundation. (R Vol. 1, p. 289). The District only stated, "Upon review
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of the record in this matter, the Court is left with the firm belief that Cindy, Jodi, and John
brought this appeal frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation. (R Vol. 1, p. 289).
Accordingly, Vicki and Rodney shall recover their attorney fees on appeal." (R Vol. 1, p. 289).
Since the Court failed to provide findings and conclusion the District Court erred and its decision
should be overturned.
Lastly, it was inappropriate for the District Court to grant attorney fees when he cited an
invalid Judgment that was drafted after the appeal was already argued and closed. As argued
above the District Court only found findings of facts and conclusions of law within Judgment II.
Judgment II was a invalid judgment that was signed after the appeal was closed. If this Judgment
II failed to exist, the District Court should have found that the Magistrate Court erred by failing
to issue findings of facts and conclusions of law. It was clearly prejudicial for the District Court
to grant attorney fees under these circumstances. Therefore, this Court should respectfully
reverse the District Court decision in granting fees against the Appellants on the lower appeal.
V.

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 parties may be allowed attorney fees and costs on
probate appeals. See Estate of E. A. Collins v. Geist, 143 Idaho 821, 829, 153 P.3d 1167, 1175
(2007) see also; In re Estate ofSpencer, 106 Idaho 316,321,678 P.2d 108, 113 (Ct. App. 1984);
Ko/ouch v. First Sec. Bank (in Re Estate ofKo/ouch), 128 Idaho 186, 198,911 P.2d 779, 791 (Ct.

App. 1996). Idaho Code§ 12-121 states:
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought, pursued
or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. This section shall
not alter, repeal or amend any statute that otherwise provides for the award of
attorney's fees. The term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any person,
partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or
political subdivision thereof. Id.
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The Appellants request that this Court grant Appellants' attorney fees and costs pursuant
to Idaho Code § 12-121 because it is clear that the Magistrate erred in issue findings of facts and
conclusions of law. In addition, it is clear that the District Court erred by citing to a invalid
Judgment II in supporting that the Magistrate issued findings of facts and conclusions of law.
Furthermore, the District Court clearly erred in awarding attorney fees to the Appellees as they
failed to request attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121, and the appeal was not
pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation because the Appellants prevailed in
part. Since the District Court's errs are clear, Defendants are now defending this appeal
frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The District Court erred by concluding that the Magistrate Court issued Findings of Facts
and Conclusions of Law. The District Court inappropriately cited Judgment II to determine that
the Magistrate Court issued findings of facts and conclusions of law. The March 27th, 2017
hearing did not have any findings of facts and conclusions oflaw. Therefore, pursuant to I.R.C.P.
83(f)(B)(3) the District Court should have either remanded the case back to the Magistrate Court
or conducted a Trial De Novo.
The District Court also erred by applying the wrong standards of review. The District
Court should have applied the clearly erroneous or a de novo review standard. Although the
District Court cited the clearly erroneous standard of review to be applied to the accounting and
sale of the home, he wrongly applied an abuse of discretion standard.
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Lastly, if this Court finds that the record on March 27th, 2017 had either findings of fact
or conclusions of law, the findings of fact of the Magistrate were clearly erroneous and the
Magistrate Court's conclusions of laws were of clear error.
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